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1.
See "Moral Community and Animal
Rights," American Philosophical Quarterly 17
(1980), pp. 45-52, or Morals Reson and
Animals (Philadelphia:
Temple University
Press, 1987), Chapter 8.
2.

(New York:

6
Avon Books, 1975), pp. 6-
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ONTHE
RELEVANCE
OF MARGINAL
HUMANS:
A Repry To
Sapontzis

If we start by presuming that the interests
of others should not (prima facie) be
disregarded, then the burden of proof is
clearly on those who maintain a speciesist
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Notes

a speciesist doctrine is one which gives
such great moral importance to what typically
distinguishes one species from others that it
leads to disregarding the interests of those
others in favor of satisfying the interests of
members of the favored species.

prejudice.

:rt:-M

treatment of marginal humans, I agree with
Evelyn that speciesism is a prejudice.

prejudice of speciesism lies not in the fact that
marginal humans are treated better than
animals but in valuing typically superior human
intelligence so highly that the interests and
suffering of animals are considered morally
insignificant in comparison to those of humans,
which is to say normal humans.
He thus
focuses on the issue of animal suffering, which
is the motivating concern of animal advocates,
and the moral insignificance of animals'
supposedly inferior intelligence as an excuse
for not taking their SUffering
suffering seriously. This
analysis suggests characterizing speciesism in
a rather different way than either of the two
definitions Evelyn has given us.
Such a
characterization might run as follows:

doctrine to demonstrate why

>-~

it is not a

And I think that in contemporary,
society

we

do

start

with

Evelyn Pluhar

that

presumption, since the idea that animals should
I couldn't agree more with Professor
Sapontzis' contention that the root of human
willingness to sacrifice nonhuman animals is
the assumption that our "superior" mental
abilities license the exploitation of so-called
The - "untutored" view is
"lesser" beings.
The>
shared by mainstream ethical theorists, who
hold that autonomous moral agents ('persons'
in the strictest sense of that term) are the
primary possessors of basic moral rights. I
pointed this out ~t the beginning of this paper,

not be treated cruelly is a commonplace today,
the controversy thus being not over whether
animals are morally considerable at ail but
more specifically over what sorts or degrees
of moral status they have and what sorts or
degrees of moral responsibility or obligation
we have to them. It follows that the question
of whether speciesism is a prejudice covers a
whole range of questions:
does our
characteristically superior intelligence justify
our routinely killing animals for entertainment
or meat, justify our routinely imprisoning
them for amusement or profit, justify our
routinely making them sick to cure our ills, and
so forth.
I think that the answer to those
questions is "No," which is why, no matter
what one concludes about our preferential
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and I have argued about this assumption at
Steve's commentary
length elsewhere. 1

treatment of marginal humans is relevant to
this issue have strayed from the original
concept of speciesism. Peter Singer, in the
very. chapter of Animal Liberation to which
Steve refers us, describes as "irredeemably
speciesist" those who "while distinguishing
sharply between humans and other animals .....
allow no distinctions to be made within our own
species, objecting to the killing of the severely
retarded and the hopelessly senile as strongly

further underlines this very important point.
However, I disagree with his claim that our
treatment of human nonpersons ("marginal"
humans) is irrelevant to the issue of whether
speciesism is a bigoted or a justified view.
Steve offers several reasons to justify his
claim that marginal human are not "where the
action is." The most important is his charge
that I locate " the fault" or "the prejudice" in
speciesism as the inconsistent treatment of

as they object to the killing of normal adults."2
He goes on to present a version of what we
have come to call the argument from marginal
cases, the very argument to which speciesists
know they must respond.

human and nonhuman nonpersons instead of in
the assumption that the personhood which
characterizes our species is of paramount
moral importance.
here.
happen

First, this is a false dilemma.
to

believe

The argument from marginal cases is often
combined with the charge that speciesism is
In this
analogous to racism and sexism.
context, the analogy must not be and never has
No
been presented as thoroughgoing.
nonspeciesist would ever compare blacks or
women to mentally deficient white men. The
point of the analogy is that it is wrong to treat

I have a two-part reply
that

the

I do

personhood

assumption or criterion is mistaken.

But

surely it is also mistaken to treat beings who,
on one's own view, have the same moral
status, in morally dissimilar ways.

The recent

defenders of speciesism certainly take the

~~

~~
beings whom one regards as morally similar,
be they human or nonhuman nonpersons, or
women and men, or blacks and whites, in
morally dissimilar ways.
The burden is on
speciecists to show that their view does not
belong in this group. However,.af1.e.r. one has
argued that the right to life is not restricted to
persons or to members of personhoodpersonhood
characterized species, it becomes appropriate
to raise the analogy between speciesism and
racism/sexism in a much more general way,
for one would then be entitled to say that
normal humans and many other beings are
morally similar. In the face of this, continued
preference for humans at the expense of
others would be just as bigoted, in all
Current
respects, as racism or sexism.
defenders of species ism can hardly be
impressed by this moral general analogy, of
course, since it merely begs the question
against them.
The more restricted analogy
which can be drawn in conjuction with the
argument from marginal cases has much more
sting.

charge of inconsistency extremely seriously,
as well they should; they devote all their
energies to defeating it (unsuccessfully, as I
argue). Second, the focus of this paper is
speciesism. Speciesism as such is the view
that a right to life or preferential treatment
may be accorded on grounds of species, i. e.,
that otherwise morally similar beings may be
treated differentially for that reason.
Although it may at bottom be a prejudiced
view, the assumption that persons are the
primary possessors of basic moral rights is
not in itself speciesist. Hence, my concern in
1bl§. paper is to show that recent defenders of
speciesism, who try to forge links between the
personhood assumption and nonpersons
belonging to personhood-characterized species,
fail to justify our radically different treatment
of human and nonhuman persons. How could
this be irrelevant to the question of whether
speciesism can be justified?
Contrary to what Steve suggests, I do not
believe that those of us who think the
BErrWEEN THE SPECIES
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coin is that
nonhumans. The other side of this cOin
failure to answer their arguments contributes
to that exploitation.

Would we be more successful in making a
case for nonhuman rights if we redefined
'speciesism' along the lines Steve proposes and
then attacked it? I do not think so. Steve's
version of speciesism, which entails that the
interests of those who don't belong to the
"right" species may simply be disregarded to

We are all opposed to unjustified suffering
and death. That is why it is imperative to
determine whether speciesism is justified.
Showing that it isn't is deadly serious
business, not "an abstract intellectual game."

satisfy members of the favored species, is
much easier to counter than the view which I
have been attacking. The limitations of this
"straw speciesism" are well-illustrated in
Thomas Young's article on the killing of
animals. He too defines speciesism in terms of
disregarding interests merely on species
That is why he refuses to call
grounds.
himself a speciesist, holding as he does that it
would be wrong to inflict gratuitous pain on
nonhumans. 3 Yet, as I discussed, he proceeds

If we are ever to get anywhere in securing
nonhuman animals their due, it can only be by
having justification on our side.

~

See my "Moral Agents and Moral
Patients," BETWEEN THE SPECIES 4(1), 1988,
pp.32-45.

in my (and
to defend a view, clearly speciesist iii
Singer's) sense, which "justifies" the routine
painless killing of healthy nonhumans (but not
human nonpersons). I have a difficult time
thinking of such a view as a triumph for
"nonspeciesist thinking!"
No, we should
continue to battle the strongest position our
opponents have to offer us.

2 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New
York: Avon Books, 1975), Chapter 1, p. 20.
3 Thomas Young, "The Morality of Killing
Animals:
Four Arguments,"
ETHICS AND
ANIMALS V (4), 1984, pp. 88-101. Se my
footnote 33 in "Speciesism: A Form of Bigotry
or a Justified View?"

I agree with Steve that it would be ghastly
if the goal of refuting speciesist arguments
were to induce moral consistency merely for
its own sake. Those of us who reject the
exploitation of nonhumans have no wish to see
sentient marginal humans in laboratory cages
or feedlots. The goal is to make speciesists
realize that something is dreadfully wrong
with their initial assumptions about the
treatment of nonhumans, and in my experience
that is the usual result. The few who, like
Frey, conclude instead that vivisection of
sentient marginal humans must be permissable,
must be confronted in additional ways. The
argument from marginal cases is insufficient
to carrry the whole burden of the case for
nonhuman rights, as I have argued elsewhere. 4
However, this does not alter the fact that

4 "The Personhood View and the Argument
from Marginal Cases," PHILOSOHPICA 39,
1987 (1), pp. 23-28.
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